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 SYMPOSIUM KEYNOTE 
The DTSA and the New Secrecy 
Ecology 
By Orly Lobel* 
ABSTRACT 
The Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), which passed in May 2016, 
amends the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”), a 1996 federal statute that 
criminalizes trade secret misappropriation. The EEA has been amended 
several times in the past five years to increase penalties for violations and 
expand the available causes of action, the definition of a trade secret, and 
the types of behaviors that are deemed illegal. The creation of a federal 
civil cause of action is a further expansion of the secrecy ecology, and the 
DTSA includes several provisions that broaden the reach of trade secrets 
and their protection. This article raises questions about the expansive tra-
jectory of trade secret law and its relationship to entrepreneurship, infor-
mation flow, and job mobility. Lobel argues that an ecosystem that sup-
ports innovation must balance secrecy with a culture of openness and ex-
changes of knowledge. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) created a federal civil cause of action 
against the misappropriation of trade secrets for the first time in the nation’s history. 
The DTSA was introduced by Senator Orrin G. Hatch on July 29, 2015,1 and passed 
with little debate or controversy in both the House and Senate.2 On May 11, 2016, 
President Obama signed the bill into law,3 which became effective immediately. 
However, the DTSA is not without risk. This article discusses the potential perils 
of the DTSA and the expansion of trade secret protection. In particular, it highlights 
the ways the DTSA may be used for anti-competitive purposes, and how the DTSA 
may have a negative impact on access to knowledge, collaboration, and talent mo-
bility. 
The first section describes the ways in which the DTSA expands the protections 
that have traditionally been in the province of the states. The second section de-
scribes how this expansion should be understood as part of an already recently re-
buffed federal secrecy ecology, especially in relation to the rise in criminal prose-
cutorial activity under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (“EEA”). The section 
also explains how traditionally trade secret law was treated with caution because of 
its ambiguous policy effects. The third section analyzes these recent developments 
from an innovation policy perspective, and highlights the potential risks of over-
protection of valuable knowledge and human capital. In particular, the section con-
siders whether the DTSA’s language adopts the controversial doctrine of inevitable 
disclosure and explains why the doctrine can have harmful effects on innovation. 
 
II. AN EXPANSION ON ALL FRONTS 
The DTSA established federal subject matter jurisdiction for the theft of trade 
secrets, becoming “the most significant expansion of federal law in intellectual 
property since the Lanham Act in 1946.”4 The DTSA expands the existing trade 
secrecy ecology in several ways. First, rather than preempting state law, the DTSA 
adds a federal cause of action.5 Second, the DTSA defines trade secrets and what 
constitutes misappropriation more expansively.6 Third, the DTSA includes unprec-
edentedly strong remedies.7 
                                                          
* This symposium article is based on Professor Orly Lobel’s keynote presentation at the March 10, 
2017 symposium entitled “Implementing and Interpreting the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016,” hosted 
by the University of Missouri School of Law’s Center for Intellectual Property and Entrepreneurship and 
the School’s Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review. 
     1.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, S. 1890, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted). 
 2. Gregory Korte, Obama Signs Trade Secrets Bill, Allowing Companies to Sue, USA TODAY (May 
11, 2016, 4:29 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/05/11/obama-signs-trade-se-
crets-bill-allowing-companies-sue/84244258/. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Eric Goldman et al., Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (S. 
1890, H.R. 3326), CYBERLAW.STANFORD.EDU 1 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://cyberlaw.stan-
ford.edu/files/blogs/2015%20Professors%20Letter%20in%20Opposi-
tion%20to%20DTSA%20FINAL.pdf. 
 5. Bret A. Cohen et al., Explaining the Defend Trade Secrets Act, AM. B. ASS’N (Sept. 2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/09/03_cohen.html. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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The DTSA expanded the trade secret ecology by amending the EEA to include 
a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.8 Traditionally, trade 
secret law has been primarily a creature of state law. Thus, before the enactment of 
the DTSA, absent diversity jurisdiction, or an independent federal cause of action, 
owners of misappropriated trade secrets were limited to seeking remedies in state 
courts.9 Prior to the enactment of the DTSA, a relatively uniform system of trade 
secret law existed, as the vast majority of states had adopted the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act (“UTSA”),10 while a few states continued to rely on common law.11 In 
1996, Congress enacted the EEA, which established criminal penalties for theft of 
trade secrets, but did not yet create a federal civil cause of action.12 The DTSA 
amended the EEA to create a private cause of action for owners, both individuals 
and corporations of misappropriated trade secrets.13 The amendment does not 
preempt existing state trade secret law, and thereby allows the owner of a misap-
propriated trade secret to file under both federal and state law.14 Now, owners of 
trade secrets can bring civil actions in federal court as long as there has been trade 
secret misappropriation “related to product[s] or service[s] used in, or intended for 
use in, interstate or foreign commerce.”15 
The DTSA includes very broad definitions of the terms “trade secret” and “mis-
appropriation.” Trade secrets are defined as “all forms and types of financial, busi-
ness, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, 
plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, tech-
niques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, 
and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, 
graphically, photographically, or in writing.”16 This broad definition of a “trade se-
cret” allows companies to file suits against the misappropriation of nearly any type 
of knowledge, as long as the company can show the knowledge was secret, and 
reasonable measures were taken to maintain its secrecy. The DTSA also broadly 
defines “misappropriation” as an “acquisition of a trade secret of another by a per-
son who knows or has reason to know the trade secret was acquired by improper 
means . . . or disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied 
consent by a person” under certain conditions.17 
The remedies available under the DTSA are equally expansive. They include 
injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and awarding of attorney fees.18 Where 
the trade secret is “willfully and maliciously misappropriated” a court may award 
exemplary damages double the damage amount already awarded along with attor-
ney’s fees where the misappropriation or claim of misappropriation was in bad 
                                                          
 8. Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 (West 2016). 
 9. Cohen, supra note 5. 
 10. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985). 
 11. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§757-758 (AM. LAW INST. 1939); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). In addition, several states provide crim-
inal statutes for theft of trade secrets. CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (West 2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 31.05 (West 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:15-1 (West 2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.07 (McKinney 
1965). 
 12. Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1831 (West 2013). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Cohen, supra note 5. 
 15. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b) (West 2016). 
 16. Cohen, supra note 5. 
 17. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(5). 
 18. Id. § 1836(b)(3). 
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faith.19 Furthermore, under “extraordinary circumstances,” a court can grant an ex 
parte seizure order, which trade secret owners can apply for in order to prevent the 
dissemination of a trade secret.20 Before granting the seizure, courts must find that 
(1) a temporary restraining order or another form of equitable relief is inadequate, 
and (2) that “immediate and irreparable injury will occur if the seizure is not or-
dered.”21 Again, this is an expansion upon previously existing state trade secret laws 
where ex parte seizures are unavailable and as will be discussed further in the third 
section, the remedy may negatively impact smaller and new companies in disputes 
against incumbents. 
 
III. MARKET SECRECY AS A GOVERNMENT FRONTIER 
The DTSA should be understood as part of a larger effort to curtail the loss of 
proprietary information in current markets. The United States has been leading a 
global campaign to strengthen trade secrecy laws and enforcement.22 The U.S. 
Trade Office in the past decade has strongly critiqued countries, and even the Eu-
ropean Union, for failing to “have robust systems for protecting trade secrets, in-
cluding deterrent penalties for criminal trade secret theft.”23 Not coincidentally, in 
May 2016, the same month the DTSA was enacted, the EU passed a new directive 
“on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade se-
crets) against their unlawful acquisition, use, and disclosure.”24 On the domestic 
front, the EEA was amended twice within the last few years to increase penalties,25 
to expand the scope of the statute, and the definition of misappropriation.26 The 
EEA expanded the definition of a “trade secret” to include not only “products,” but 
also information used in “services” involving interstate commerce.27 
The effort to restrict trade secret misappropriation is also evident in the recent 
increase of prosecutorial activity and educational efforts. Prosecutorial activity un-
der the EEA has risen significantly. In the first five years of its enactment, there 
were 11 prosecutions under the EEA.28 In the past decade, the number of 
                                                          
 19. Id. § (b)(3)(C). 
 20. Id. § (b)(2)(A). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Ambassador Ronald Kirk, 2012 Special 301 Report 17, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (Apr. 2012), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2012%20Special%20301%20Re-
port_0.pdf. 
 23. Id. at 17. 
 24. Trade Secrets, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-prop-
erty/trade-secrets_en (last visited Nov. 26, 2017). 
 25. Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012, H.R. 6029, 112th Cong. 
(2013) (enacted) (amending §§ 1831 and 1832 to increase the maximum penalties). 
 26. Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.112-236, 126 Stat. 1627 (amending 
18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)) (changing “or included in a product that is produced for or placed in [foreign 
commerce]” to “a product or service used in or intended for use in [interstate or foreign commerce]”) 
(emphasis added). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Derek Mason et al., The Economic Espionage Act: Federal Protection for Corporate Trade Se-
crets, 16 THE COMPUTER LAW 14 (1999); see also Robin L. Kuntz, How Not to Catch A Thief: Why the 
Economic Espionage Act Fails to Protect American Trade Secrets, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 901, 908-
09 (2013) (describing cases prior to 2009 as “unicorn sightings”). 
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prosecutions has increased dramatically to several hundreds of cases.29 In addition 
to increasing the amount of prosecutions, governmental educational efforts have 
spread awareness on the importance of preventing and reporting trade secret theft.30 
The Department of Justice published a report about trade secret prosecutions,31 as 
did the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive,32 the Congressional 
Research Service,33 and the U.S. Defense Security Service.34 In 2013, the U.S. De-
partments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Treasury, the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative announced a joint strategic plan to mitigate trade secret 
theft.35 As Rochelle Dreyfuss and I have argued in a previous article, the increased 
criminal prosecution has been part of an overall rising secrecy focus, and the pas-
sage of a federal civil cause of action should be understood to be part of this ecology 
as well.36 
Dreyfuss and I have shown that these developments are a dramatic break with 
the past.37 Federal law has always regulated patents, copyright, and trademark, but 
trade secrets have traditionally been “strictly the province of the states.”38 In the 
past, the common understanding was that trade secrecy law should be limited be-
cause its effects are “profoundly ambiguous.”39 
On the one hand, trade secrecy acts as an incentive to innovate (and a com-
plement to patent protection); it is cheaper, can last longer, and covers ad-
vances that are not developed enough or sufficiently inventive to qualify 
for patents. But trade secrecy protection can also act as a substitute for 
patents. The more it reduces the risk of loss, the greater the temptation to 
                                                          
 29. See Mark L. Krotoski, Common Issues and Challenges in Prosecuting Trade Secret and Eco-
nomic Espionage Act Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 7 (Nov. 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/usao/legacy/2009/12/10/usab5705.pdf; see also Peter J. Toren, A Look at 16 Years of EEA 
Prosecutions, LAW360 (Sept. 19, 2012, 12:18 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/378560/a-look-at-
16-years-of-eea-prosecutions. According to an administration report, from 2009-2013, the FBI was in-
volved in 20 cases—nearly double the total of the first five years. See Administration Strategy on Miti-
gating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 7 (Feb. 2013), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/938321/download [hereinafter Administration Strategy Report]. 
 30. See Administration Strategy Report, supra note 29, at 12. 
 31. See Evan Williams, Border Searches In Trade Secret and Other Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 52, 
53 (Nov. 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2009/12/10/usab5705.pdf (in-
cluding articles on issues arising in the prosecution of EEA cases, common defenses, parallel proceed-
ings, use of electronic evidence, and sentencing); see also H. Marshall Jarrett et al., Prosecuting Intel-
lectual Property Crimes Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crimi-
nal-ccips/legacy/2015/03/26/prosecuting_ip_crimes_manual_2013.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2017). 
 32. Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Eco-
nomic Collection of Industrial Espionage 2009-2011, OFF. OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
EXECUTIVE (Oct. 2011), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-055.pdf [herein-
after ONCIX Report]. 
 33. Charles Doyle, Stealing Trade Secrets and Economic Espionage: An Overview of the Economic 
Espionage Act, CONG. RES. SERV. (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42681.pdf. 
 34. Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Reporting from Defense Industry, DEF. 
SECURITY SERV., http://www.dss.mil/documents/ci/2012-unclass-trends.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 
2017). 
 35. Administration Strategy Report, supra note 29, at 2. 
 36. Rochelle Dreyfuss & Orly Lobel, Economic Espionage as Reality or Rhetoric: Equating Trade 
Secrecy with National Security, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 446 (2016). 
 37. Id. at 423. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 424-25. 
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rely on trade secrets instead of patents. Since trade secrecy does not require 
disclosure of the technical details of inventions, over-zealous trade secrecy 
protection can chill innovation, reduce competition, impede entrepreneur-
ship, and interfere with the government’s ability to regulate for safety, 
health, and environmental concerns.40 
Thus, trade secret laws have always been approached cautiously, with the un-
derstanding that defending trade secrets requires a very delicate balance, lest such 
protections do more harm than good. The effect of the recent trends in strengthening 
trade secret laws, in particular, the passage of the DTSA, must now be evaluated in 
relation to the continuing goal of market innovation, including entrepreneurship, 
the flow of knowledge, and job mobility. 
 
IV. POTENTIAL PERILS OF THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT 
A. Trade Secrecy and Innovation Policy 
In 2015, a group of law professors submitted a letter to Congress in opposition 
to the DTSA.41 The opposition sprung from the DTSA’s broad scope and risk of 
increasing the duration and cost of litigation, harming new businesses and innova-
tors due to the ex parte seizure remedy, and the risk that, perversely, the DTSA 
would result in less rather the more uniformity.42 In addition, the group was con-
cerned that the Act might recognize the controversial doctrine of inevitable disclo-
sure, which prevents former employees from accepting new jobs with competi-
tors.43 This last concern will be the focus of the discussion below. 
Almost by definition, intellectual property (“IP”) law restricts knowledge and 
information from being shared.44 IP laws, therefore, are always about striking a del-
icate balance. The laws establish an incentive system to encourage innovation and 
risk-taking.45 At the same time, the enclosure of knowledge must be limited in time 
and scope to allow competitors and the next generation of innovators to build upon 
previous innovation. From an innovation policy perspective, the question is there-
fore not how much or how little the DTSA protects secrets in abstract absolute 
terms, but what line drawing best supports the pace of technological development, 
economic growth, and progress in the arts and sciences. Ultimately, one must ask 
whether a highly interlocking set of protections against trade secrecy leakage will 
fuel, or conversely, erect barriers to innovation and social welfare. One must re-
member that, paradoxically, increased efforts to protect confidential information 
                                                          
 40. Id. at 425. 
 41. Brook K. Baker et al., Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the “Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014” 
(S. 226) and the “Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014” (H.R. 5233), CYBERLAW.STANFORD.EDU 1 
(Aug. 26, 2014), http://cyberlaw.stan-
ford.edu/files/blogs/FINAL%20Professors%27%20Letter%20Opposing%20Trade%20Secret%20Legis
lation.pdf. Full disclosure: I was part of the Law Professor’s Letter in Opposition to the DTSA. 
 42. Id. at 2. 
 43. Id. at 5. 
 44. Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and The Reach of Intellectual 
Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 791 (2015). 
 45. Id. at 796. 
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can hinder the production of such information and harm the innovative capabilities 
of the economy.  
Notably, the risk of expanding trade secrecy too broadly also relates to global 
politics and the willingness of the United States to cooperate with other countries 
in the joint interest of scientific and technological progress. Universities and private 
companies may become fearful of individuals originating from outside the United 
States coming in to deplete the talent pool, creating virtual national walls which 
prevent fruitful exchange. As Dreyfuss and I have argued, the recent government 
reports about the rising threat of trade secrecy loss include repeated referents to 
“Chinese actors [as] the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators,”46 and to 
“the many Russian immigrants with advanced technical skills who work for leading 
U.S. companies.”47 The government’s educational material under the EEA frames 
the protection of trade secrets as a national security issue by routinely focusing on 
China and Russia as potential suspects and threats.48 Dreyfuss and I conclude “the 
argument for greater protection appears to derive at least some of its power from 
xenophobia.”49 The argument is not that American businesses do not have a legiti-
mate interest in protecting their trade secrets. Rather, one must understand that any 
trade secrecy regime has trade-offs within itself: one must be cautious that the ben-
efits of enhanced protections, warnings, monitoring, litigation, prosecution, and en-
forcement are not outweighed by the costs of chilling valuable innovation, ex-
changes, and collaboration. 
Given their expansive, open-ended definition, trade secrets are the broadest 
type of intellectual property.50 Because of their “do-it-yourself” nature, which does 
not require application or registration, trade secrets do not come with a disclosure 
or enablement requirement like patent law.51 Also, their duration is potentially the 
longest: as long as they remain secret, the protection continues.52 In other words, 
trade secrets can include nearly any type of information and remain a secret forever. 
On the other hand, trade secrets have always been considered a weak form of pro-
tection. In 1974, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the Supreme Court upheld a 
state trade secrecy law against a preemption challenge by the federal patent act.53 
The Court reasoned that trade secret law would not take knowledge out of the public 
domain because trade secrets are weak forms of protection and, when possible, 
companies would opt to patent their inventions instead.54 The Court stated that trade 
secrets are so vulnerable to discovery that “[t]he possibility that an inventor who 
believes his invention meets the standards of patentability will sit back, [and] rely 
on trade secret law . . . is remote indeed.”55 What was true in 1974 no longer appears 
                                                          
 46. ONCIX Report, supra note 32, at i. 
 47. Id. at 8. 
 48. Dreyfuss & Lobel, supra note 36, at 438. 
 49. Id. at 426. 
 50. What is a Trade Secret?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_busi-
ness/trade_secrets/trade_secrets.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2017). 
 51. Patents or Trade Secrets?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_busi-
ness/trade_secrets/patent_trade.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2017). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
 54. Id. at 484-85. 
 55. Id. at 490. 
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to be true today. Current trade secrecy protection often acts as a substitute for pa-
tents.56 
The stronger the protection, the greater the temptation to rely on trade secret 
law rather than patent law.57 Both the strengthening of trade secret law and the un-
certainty about patent eligibility of certain biotechnologies, business processes, and 
software inventions may lead today’s firms to rely more heavily on trade secret 
laws.58 This raises a red flag: since trade secret laws do not require disclosure of the 
technical details of an invention, and protections are now strong both on the civil 
and criminal side, the traditional balance struck in intellectual property law may be 
disrupted. 
The disruption of this delicate balance brings new risks. The new secrecy ecol-
ogy, including the broad reach and expansive scope of the DTSA, can alter innova-
tion environments in ways that chill scientific and technological progress. Because 
they are secret in nature, empirical research on trade secrets has been inherently 
difficult to conduct. Therefore, it is difficult to study the effects of recent policy 
changes on private innovation, and any reform must proceed with caution. And yet, 
as is discussed in the following section, many recent empirical studies provide in-
dications of these risks, highlighting the effects of diminishing job mobility on eco-
nomic growth, entrepreneurship, and the flow of knowledge. 
B. Talent Mobility and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
Trade secret law has a tripolar identity, embodying characteristics of statutory, 
tort, and contract law. It is a pillar of intellectual property, a type of tort of unfair 
business practices, and a relational contractual moderator. In effect, trade secret 
laws regulate the relationship between employers and employees. As Professor 
Dennis Crouch of the University of Missouri School of Law stated, because trade 
secrecy disputes most commonly involve former employees, the DTSA becomes “a 
shoe horn for contract and employment law claims.”59 The misappropriation com-
ponent becomes a question of interpreting the duties that shaped the contractual 
relationship. 
Because of the centrality of intellectual property and human capital in today’s 
knowledge-centered economy, employers unsurprisingly attempt to protect their se-
crets and limit the movement of their highly skilled workers to competitors.60 Both 
in civil litigation and criminal prosecution, the majority of cases have involved dis-
putes between employers and their current or former employees.61 Trade secret dis-
putes have expanded to new subject matters and modes of infringement.62 For ex-
ample, when trade secret law encompasses client lists, pricing information, 
                                                          
 56. Orly Lobel, Filing for a Patent Versus Keeping Your Invention a Trade Secret, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Nov. 21, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/11/filing-for-a-patent-versus-keeping-your-invention-a-trade-se-
cret. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Dennis Crouch, DTSA as a Shoe Horn for Contract and Employment Law Claims, PATENTLYO 
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/04/contract-employment-claims.html. 
 60. See Office of Economic Policy, Non-compete Contracts: Economic Effects and Policy Implica-
tions, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 1, 3 (Mar. 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-
policy/Documents/UST%20Non-competes%20Report.pdf. 
 61. Dreyfuss & Lobel, supra note 36, at 461. 
 62. Id. at 466-67. 
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marketing strategies, and business processes, employers can claim ownership over 
knowledge which limits the ability for an employee to take a new position working 
for a competitor or founding a new company.63 
Moreover, in recent years, employment contracts routinely include non-disclo-
sure agreements with expansive and open-ended lists of confidential information—
adding a contractual layer on top of statutory protections.64 The message to the job 
market is simple: if employees use knowledge and information from a previous po-
sition, those employees may be the subject of criminal and civil prosecutions.65 This 
means that with every expansion of trade secret law, employees face higher risks 
upon leaving an employer. In turn, the continued expansion of trade secrecy litiga-
tion risks chilling lawful exchanges of knowledge and talent. In a series of recent 
publications, as well as in my book Talent Wants to Be Free, I analyze a range of 
empirical evidence which suggests that curtailing the flow of talent and knowledge 
can have detrimental effects on innovation.66 
Entrepreneurship is especially harmed when workers fear leaving their employ-
ers. If employees are unable to use their knowledge, or human capital learned 
through their employment with established firms, they are not only less likely to 
leave, they are particularly less likely to go to less established, more vulnerable 
entities.67 Consequently, employees are less likely to consider starting their own 
businesses, build their own products, or create new services.68 Competitors might 
also be reluctant to hire away employees for fear of being criminally or civilly pros-
ecuted. Smaller, newer companies can be restricted from growing or entering a mar-
ket by larger, long-established firms with more resources.69 Such established firms 
can threaten IP litigation for the purpose of stifling entrepreneurs as well as new 
startups, and competitors. 
Beyond the more general threat and costs of litigation under the DTSA, the 
controversial ex parte seizure provision, could have particularly harmful effects on 
small companies. If granted, the plaintiff can seize property to stop the usage and 
spread of the trade secret without giving the defendant any opportunity to respond.70 
However, the DTSA does limit the ex parte provisions to “extraordinary circum-
stances.”71 It requires parties show with “reasonable particularity” what property is 
to be seized, and that the target would destroy the property if put on notice.72 And 
yet, as one critique put it, “[s]o much business information can potentially qualify 
as a trade secret that it is easy for unscrupulous plaintiffs to manufacture trade secret 
                                                          
 63. See Office of Economic Policy, supra note 60, at 6-7. 
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claims and use them as strategic weapons.”73 Thus, the concern is that the ex parte 
provision will be abused by larger companies predating against competitor 
startups.74 
Because of the risks that trade secrecy will be used in patterned ways against 
competitors and former employees who want to move in the market, the controver-
sial inevitable disclosure doctrine (“the doctrine”), which allows courts to issue an 
injunction against taking on a new job was debated before its enactment.75 Under 
the doctrine, a plaintiff can “prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by 
demonstrating that [the] defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead him to 
rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.”76 The doctrine is controversial because it cre-
ates an ex-post de facto non-compete action against a former employee, even in the 
absence of neither actual trade secret misappropriation, nor a non-compete clause 
in the employee’s contract.77 
Some states enforce the doctrine and permit courts to issue an injunction to 
enjoin a former employee from working for a competitor if the court is convinced 
the employee would “inevitably” use their former employer’s secrets in their new 
position.78 Other states, such as California and Maryland, have explicitly rejected 
the doctrine as bad policy.79 At least some evidence exists to suggest that states that 
have adopted the doctrine experience less job mobility.80 In one study that compared 
states that adopted the doctrine to those that reject it, researchers combined analyses 
of state trade secrets laws on the inevitable disclosure doctrine with records of 
changes of employers from the Current Population Survey to determine the effect 
of inevitable disclosure on labor mobility.81 The study finds that in states where 
courts have ruled against the doctrine there is “a 9.7 [%] increase in the probability 
of a university-educated worker changing employer, and a statistically insignificant 
3.6 [%] reduction in the probability of a less educated worker changing employer.”82 
Another study by Wharton researchers examines the consequences of adopting 
the doctrine in Illinois.83 The researchers conclude that strengthening employer-
friendly trade secrecy by adopting the doctrine adversely affects innovation.84 The 
researchers show that adoption of the doctrine is correlated with a decrease in pa-
tenting as well as a decrease in the quality of patents granted.85 Comparing different 
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types of patents that would more likely lend themselves to substitution by secrecy, 
the study rules out the possibility that the effect is due to a shift away from patent 
protection to trade secrecy.86 Rather, the researchers conclude that the more likely 
mechanism that explains the decline in innovation is that of dampened employee 
incentives in an increased secrecy environment.87 The study explains that when job 
mobility is more of a possibility, employee inventors are incentivized to innovate 
to signal their quality in the job market.88 When mobility is constrained by an in-
creased secrecy ecology, this incentive structure is curtailed.89 
Given the controversial and problematic nature of the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine, the final language of the DTSA represents a compromise between the two 
opposing approaches of states which adopted, and states which rejected it.90 The 
DTSA states that an injunction issued under the DTSA may not “prevent a person 
from entering into an employment relationship,” and any conditions placed on a 
former employee’s employment in an injunction must be based on “evidence of 
threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the person 
knows.”91 The language of “threatened misappropriation” could be interpreted as a 
basis for adopting the concept of inevitable disclosure. Yet, the DTSA specifies that 
the order may not “otherwise conflict with an applicable [s]tate law prohibiting re-
straints on the practice of lawful profession, trade, or business.”92 This could be 
understood to prohibit the adoption of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure in states, 
primarily California, that deem non-compete clauses void. It could further be inter-
preted to prohibit the adoption of the doctrine in any state that has explicitly rejected 
the doctrine under its state trade secret law. 
The DTSA’s first year shows there is, at the very least, uncertainty about 
whether this eventual language allows the use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
under the DTSA. In one DTSA case, the federal court in the Northern District of 
Illinois issued an injunction against an employee seeking to join a competitor.93 The 
case involved an employee downloading files onto a personal thumb drive before 
taking a job with a competitor, and the case was litigated under both the DTSA and 
the Illinois Trade Secrets Act.94 While Illinois has explicitly adopted the doctrine of 
inevitable disclosure, the facts of this case indicate an actual misappropriation such 
that the injunction does not represent the stronger and more controversial scenario 
of inevitable disclosure, which involves no showing of actual taking of infor-
mation.95 
Less than a month later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit applied the inevitable disclosure doctrine and issued a temporary restraining 
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order (“TRO”) when an employee sought to move to a direct competitor.96 The for-
mer employer claimed the employee had access to confidential information, includ-
ing “customer lists, price lists, and marketing and sales strategies.”97 The district 
court issued a TRO, stating that if the former employee began work with the com-
petitor, he would likely “be assigned to solicit his former clients” and would “likely 
use his specialized and confidential knowledge to the detriment of Fres-co.”98 On 
appeal to the Third Circuit, the Court explained that under both the Pennsylvania 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the DTSA, “misappropriation of trade secrets need 
not have already occurred to warrant injunctive relief; threatened misappropriation 
is sufficient.”99 
The court cited the Circuit’s leading case that applied the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine:100 
Given the substantial overlap (if not identity) between Hawkins’s work for 
Fres-co and his intended work for Transcontinental—same role, same in-
dustry, and same geographic region—the District Court was well within 
its discretion to conclude Hawkins would likely use his confidential 
knowledge to Fres-co’s detriment.101 
The uncertainty of the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine under 
the DTSA can be linked to other problematic aspects of the DTSA. The DTSA does 
not require a plaintiff to identify with particularity prior to discovery, the alleged 
trade secrets that were misappropriated.102 By contrast, under California law, a 
plaintiff must identify the allegedly stolen trade secrets with “reasonable particular-
ity” before discovery in order “to limit the permissible scope of discovery.”103 Cal-
ifornia courts have explained that the requirement “prevents plaintiffs from using 
the discovery process as a means to obtain the defendant’s trade secrets.”104 It is 
uncertain whether the California requirement will continue to apply in disputes be-
tween Californian litigants under the DTSA. In Space Data Corp. v. X, the court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s DTSA claim, in part for its failure to adequately identify 
the trade secrets at issue.105 However, in Mission Measurement Corp. v. Blackbaud, 
Inc., the court applied Illinois’s UTSA law in denying defendant’s motion to dis-
miss the plaintiff’s DTSA claim for failure to identify the alleged trade secrets.106 
More generally, courts have been far from uniform in how they interpret the 
DTSA. In Kuryakyn Holdings, LLC v. Ciro, LLC, the court noted “that substantively 
the UTSA and DTSA are ‘essentially the same’ . . . and that courts may look to the 
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state UTSA when interpreting the DTSA.”107 Consequently, at least in that case, the 
court applied the existing interpretation of Wisconsin’s UTSA to interpret the 
DTSA.108 Similarly, in Henry Schein v. Cook, a California district court said the 
DTSA and California’s UTSA have similar definitions of trade secret and then used 
California law to determine if the information at issue even qualified as a trade se-
cret.109 At the same time, the DTSA is a new law with different language and pro-
visions, and uncertainty remains regarding the relationship between the new DTSA 
and state law. For example, the DTSA defines “misappropriation” broadly, and con-
tains examples of unauthorized appropriations which are not listed in the UTSA.110 
These examples include transmitting, communicating, duplicating, and sketching, 
which suggests that even benign activities, like memorization, may be actionable.111 
The professors’ opposition letter warned that “the DTSA would undermine this high 
degree of uniformity by creating new differences with existing state law and by 
requiring the development of a new body of federal jurisprudence.”112 The concerns 
raised in the letter now seem to materialize with the nascent jurisprudence under the 
DTSA. 
While the DTSA presents a range of risks for employees, one promising aspect 
of the DTSA is the establishment of whistleblower protections for individuals who 
disclose trade secrets to a government official to report or investigate a violation of 
law, or to an attorney in an under-seal complaint or filing.113 In other words, the 
DTSA gives employees immunity from criminal or civil liability for reporting ille-
galities. The DTSA requires notice of this immunity in all employment contracts.114 
Since 2016, all employers are required to provide a notice-of-immunity to employ-
ees and contractors “in any contract or agreement with an employee that governs 
the use of a trade secret or other confidential information.”115 Failure to inform em-
ployees of whistleblower immunity bars employers from seeking punitive damages 
and attorneys’ fees when suing former employees for trade secret misappropriations 
under the DTSA.116 Although this is a positive development, it is an exception that 
points to the larger rule: employees are at increased risk in all other activities that 
potentially implicate the broad scope of trade secrets. A better policy would specify 
more clearly what constitutes “proper means” of acquisition and would include a 
broader range of immunities. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The DTSA has created unprecedented power in the hands of federal courts to 
oversee the contemporary trade secrecy ecology. In interpreting the new DTSA, 
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courts must aim to appease legitimate concerns about the importance of secrecy in 
an industry, while also maintaining the traditional delicate balance intellectual prop-
erty law seeks to strike between incentivizing innovation and cultivating vibrant, 
creative and inventive environments. In particular, one should aim to ensure that 
the DTSA is not used to prevent employees from moving from one job to another, 
and from using their basic skills and experience in their professional lives. 
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